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50. The requirement to provide independent advice carries with it a responsibility for objective judgement. Whilst this is partly ensured through the independence of the Inspectorate, there is also a need to ensure that the Inspectorate itself is open to challenge and has transparency within its own arrangements. This transparency becomes self-evident when Inspectors are asked to act either as expert witnesses in the courts or provide advice as arbitrators on professionally challenged judgements based on issues like changes in fire cover arrangements.
51. Components of such arrangements could include the generation of a philosophy of inspection which is shared amongst inspectorates generally and which also seeks to define methods by which the Inspectorate can be judged. Such arrangements may include a code of conduct, which enables individuals to be personally held to account, a published inspection process, which details how information is to be obtained, from what sources and how it is to be used, statements relating to the integrity of values supported by the Inspectorate (in this regard those adopted by the Civil Service would appear appropriate) and finally by the publication of documentation which illustrates how the judgement has been reached.
52. In offering itself to scrutiny the Inspectorate is effectively enabling its objectivity to be judged in a qualitative and quantitative way. Part of this process will include clearly defined benchmarks or standards and these have already been referred to earlier. There is, however, the need to place the whole judgement process within the context of both the Scottish and local fire service environments.
53. Securing an evidential base which enables this objectivity to be held to account is part of the Inspectorate's duty and, whilst a great deal of previous information is contained within the annual reporting processes, the exercise of judgements invariably is based upon nationally derived standards of performance. How best to incorporate these individual judgements into a significantly identifiable Scottish context is itself an important issue.
54. A clear relationship exists between the policy of the UK Government, the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Executive, the Fire Service Inspectorate and the individual strategies of implementation plans within fire authorities and brigades. The formation of policy through the Fire and Emergency Planning Division and the mutual relationship this involves with the Inspectorate is an area in which future fire service change will undoubtedly impact. It is important, given continuing change, that the responsibilities for progressing and verifying the implementation of Government policy be routinely clarified as part of the ongoing relationship. The setting of challenging outcomes which help meet and demonstrate achievement for the wider group of stakeholders also remains one part of the Fire Service Inspectorate's responsibility, since independent measurement of performance and efficiency is its primary function.
55. Work is ongoing, through CACFOA, to establish a benchmarking club using existing UK and Scottish guidance. This work and recommendations locally developed between Scottish Inspectorates, who are considering how they might achieve a closer working philosophy and process, are also important in consolidating the wider views on performance standards.
56. Technical considerations also impinge on a significant number of judgements and access to a range of skills becomes essential. The value derived from other agency approaches, for example finance and health and safety, are apparent.
57. Again, however, a shared common source of data would be a key component of any comparative analysis undertaken with interactive communication between users. The aspect of the Inspectorate's work which is particularly demanding in this regard is advice provided to the Scottish Executive. This activity is a routine one, often with pressing timescales and demanding high accuracy and objectivity. The Scottish Parliament will inevitably increase the demand for technical advice and, although this is as yet unquantifiable, any additional activities will place unsustainable demands upon the existing Inspectorate resources.
58. It is recognised as vital to the effectiveness of the process of policy formation that the Inspectorate provides its professional assessments. In this regard it is apparent that there is waste of the valuable high level abilities of Inspectors when they are necessarily employed gathering together research information simply because no appropriate staff exist to fulfil this function. Similar inappropriate resource utilisation also occurs in the data capture process used in the statistical return interpretation. There is therefore an identified need to ensure that resources allocated to the Inspectorate are appropriate in scale, scope and skills.
59. It is here that the dilemma of the existing arrangement can be seen very clearly. The current staffing and resource provision is incapable of sustaining existing demands. The views so far outlined in this report, if supported and desired as the way forward, demand further resources. The system of inspection capable of delivery from within existing resources, and that would include those resources allocated to inspection of Crown property including prisons in Scotland, is not able to provide the desired service. Comprehensive professional review and development requires new methods of working and technology.
60. The inspection role conducted on behalf of the Crown estate is in itself worthy of further review given that over 3 members of staff from a team of 9 are solely allocated to this activity. This review will be conducted in the forthcoming months against the background that occupiers generally are responsible for their own inspectoral arrangements within the defined limits derived from risk assessment. If, resources were released following this review their re-allocation would help offset, in a limited way, any increased costs of any improved service.
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